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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLARON D. BAILEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESBONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 18961 
Mr. Bailey, Assignee of a second position Trust Deed sued 
defendant, Trustee on the first position Trust Deed, for an account-
ing and for distribution of the excess proceeds of a Trustee's Sale. 
The court below found that the amount bid exceeded the amount due 
to Beneficiary of the Trust Deed and awarded the excess to plaintiff. 
Defendant appeals, claiming the lower court had no jurisdiction 
and/or that the case was barred by res judicata. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried, without a jury, before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court, on the 
1st and 2nd days of July, 1982. After the close of the evidence 
and the submitting of legal memoranda by both parties, the Court 
entered its Memorandum on July 30, 1982. On January 7, 
1982, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment awarding to Plaintiff and against Defendant the total 
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sum of Two Thousand Thirty Two Dollars and Fifty-Eight Cl'nts 
($2,032.58) together with interest and custs uf courl. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ·----
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the court belo•.·. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with Appellant's statement of facts where 
not inconsistent with the statement below. 
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association hereinafter refer;. 
to as "the bank", without notice to the junior lien claimant's, 
petitioned the bankruptcy court to order the bankruptcy trustee to 
surrender possession of Lot 46 HIDDEN VALLEY HILLS No. 1 Subdivisior 
praying as follows: 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that JOHN C. GREEN, Trustee, 
be directed to surrender possession of Lots 19, 44, 46 and 
21, and that plaintiff be allowed to complete the sale of 
said real property at Trustee's Sale: (R. 39) 
The bankruptcy court ruled "that the relief sought in the complaint 
by Deseret Federal Savings and Loan is granted " (R. 42) 
The bank, acting as Trustee, then noticed the sale of Lot 46. 
Upon learning of the pending sale, Mr. Bailey filed a complaint in 
bankruptcy court as a third position mechanic's lien holder and as 
a sixth position purchaser on a Uniform Real Estate Contract from 
the bankrupts to prevent the Trustee's Sale of the property and to 
invalidate the banks first position. (R. 43) 
Mr. Bailey's Complaint prayed basically as follows: 
1. That defendant's Trust Deed be voided. 
2. That plaintiff be allowed to bring the loan current. 
3. That the bankruptcy Trustee abandon and disclaim any 
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interest in and to the subject property as a burdensome asset. 
4. That the court enjoin the Trustee's Sale. 
5. That the court award damages to plaintiff against defendant 
f"r wrongful dispersal of loan funds. (R. 48) 
Though Mr. Bailey obtained an Order staying the Trustee's Sale, 
it was not timely served, and the Sale proceeded. (R. 63) At sale 
the bank bid Forty Eight Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Four 
Dollars and Fourteen Cents ($48,974.14) which bid exceeded the amount 
actually due the bank by $2,032.58 according to the findings of the 
court (R. 122-125). After sale the bank moved to have Mr. Bailey's 
complaint dismissed. The court dismissed the complaint. 
Mr. Bailey, taking the position of second lien holder which he 
had obtained by assignment from Ivory and Company, then brought an 
action in the Third Judicial District Court. Mr. Bailey's state 
court action for the first time raised the statutory claim under 
U.C.A. 57-1-29* requesting distribution of the proceeds of the 
Trustee's Sale against the bank as trustee. Thought Hr. Bailey's 
complaint contained other claims against the bank, only the claim 
under U.C.A. 57-1-29 for distribution of excess proceeds at 
Trustee's Sale was considered by the court as a basis for its award. 
(R. 122-123) 
The bank, prior to trial, brought a Motion for Summary Judgment 
claiming that the bankruptcy court's dismissal of plaintiff's com-
plaint was res judicata as to Mr. Bailey's state court claims. In 
response to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Bailey's 
counsel provided an Affidavit to the court, which Affidavit was 
uncontested by defendant. It provides in pertinent part as follows: 
* For full text of U.C.A. 57-1-29, see Appendix 1 
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[Referring to the statements of Judge Ralph R. 
Mabey at the hearing defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
on November 13, 1979] 
The Judge stated that because of the secured claims on 
the subject property, and the amount of the proceeds at the 
Trust Deed Trustee's Sale, the bankruptcy trustee, John 
Green, would have no claim on those proceeds, and the Bank-
ruptcy Court would not be interested in adjudicating the 
claims to those funds. Therefore, the bankruptcy Judge 
suggested that the Bankruptcy Court should not be involved 
in this aspect of this matter, i.e. the adjudication of 
priority in the funds received by the trustee, Edward M. 
Garrett, acting on behalf of the defendant. 
That he, the affiant, has on several occasions had 
telephone conversations with the bankruptcy trustee, John 
Green. That John Green, as trustee, has made the following 
representations: 
(a) That he, as trustee, has no claim on the proceeds 
of the Trust Deed Trustee's Sale, conducted on behalf of 
the defendant on November 9, 1979. 
(b) That the order of the bankruptcy court (Exhibit 
"C") was drafted for the purpose of extinguishing the rights 
of the junior lien claimants to the subject property such 
that if the property were thereafter sold by the defendant, 
Deseret Federal, Deseret would be required to account to 
the bankruptcy court for the funds received from such sub-
sequent sale in excess of those paid at the original trustee' 
sale on November 9, 1979. 
(c) That as far as he is concerned as trustee for the 
bankrupts' estate, the claims of the secured lien creditors 
attached to the proceeds received by Deseret at their trusteE 
sale in the same priority as they were previously attached 
to the subject real estate, and that he, as trustee for the 
unsecured creditors, would only claim an interest in the 
proceeds received from a subsequent sale by Deseret in excess 
over those received by Deseret's trustee's sale on November 
9, 1979. (R. 64-65) 
Judge Sawaya ruled that the previous dismissal by the bankruptcy c 
was not res judicata to the state court action. (R. 69) 
At trial the court found that Mr. Bailey was Assignee of the 
Ivory & Company second Trust Deed (R. 113) and entitled to the 
excess proceeds at Trustee's Sale .. (R. 113, 122-125). The court 
further found that the proceeds of sale exceeded by $2,032.58 that 
's 
CO'. 
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which the bank was entitled under the Trust deed pursuant to 
r,',/-1-29 (R. 113, 122-125). The bank does not here dispute these 
t tndings of the' trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S DISMISSAL OF MR. BAILEY'S 
COMPLAINT WAS NOT RES JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUES 
SINCE BOTH THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND 
THE ISSUES WERE DIFFERENT IN STATE COURT. 
The essence of the bank's first point on appeal is that the 
nautre and gist of Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy complaint and Mr. Bailey's 
state court complaint were identical, making dismissal of the 
bankruptcy court complaint a bar to the action filed in the state 
court. Even a superficial examination of the complaints demonstrates 
rudimentary differences. 
Bankruptcy Court Complaint 
Position of Plaintiff 
Third Position Mechanics 
Lien Holder and/or Purchaser 
under Uniform Real Estate 
Contract from Bankrupts. 
Relief Sought Against Bank 
As Lender 
1. For an Order declaring 
defendant (s) . . . Deed of 
Trust void and requiring said 
defendant to release the same 
from the subject property. 
2. For an Order requiring 
defendant Deseret to accept 
payment from plaintiff. 
. . . and reinstating said 
note and Trust Deed . . . 
State Court Claims Upon Which 
Court Granted Judgment 
Position of Plaintiff 
Assignee of Ivory and Company's 
Second Position Trust Deed. 
(R. 003, Paragraph 10.a.) 
Relief Granted Against Bank 
As Lender 
NONE 
Bankruptcy Court Complaint 
5. For damages against the 
defendant Deseret for its 
breach of its fiduciary duty 
to the plaintiff in wrongfully 
disbursing funds on the loan. 
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and for an Order requiring Deseret 
to account for all transactions 
with regard to the subject 
loan ... 
Relief Sought Against Bank 
In Its Position as Trustee 
4. For an Order enjoining the 
sale by the defendant and its 
attorney scheduled for November 
9, 1979 at 10:00 a.m. 
State Court Claims Upon Whir 
Court Granted Judgment 
NONE 
Relief Granted Against Bank 
In Its Position as Trustee 
[For an Order] to pay to th< 
plaintiff and the other parti 
entitled to the proceeds ofr 
Trustee's Sale such amounts 
and in such priority as the'· 
shall determine. 
It is clear from the comparision above, that the court based 
its award only upon that which was new and unique to the state cour 
complaint. The court's memorandum decision provides in pertinent 
as follows: 
The Court further finds that when the Bankruptcy Court 
refused to take jurisdiction over the excess funds, if there 
be any, then the State Court could proceed pursuant to 
§57-1-29 to adjudicate the priority and the rights to the 
proceeds of the trustee's sale. 
That the plaintiff did take an assignment of a trust 
deed from Ellis R. Ivory, successor in interest to Ivory, 
Inc. formerly known as Ivory Company, a Utah corporation 
and stands in their position as far a priority is concerned. 
That the note and trust deed provides for 97. interest and 
that the defendant in the foreclosure proceedings did 
charge interest at the rate of 107. from the date the note 
was declared due and payable. This was agreed to in the 
construction agreement but was not in the security agree-
ments and the Court finds it was an improper ab 
the trustee sale. The Court also finds that the attorney's 
fees were excessive, thata proper attorney fee would 
be the amount of $3,000.00 and $200.00 costs. 
- 7-
Based on the foregoing, the Court awards judgment to 
the plaintiff in the sum of $650.67 and $300.00 as amounts 
received at the trustee sale over and above what the 
beneficiary is entitled to. (R. 113-114) 
L;iter the court amended its decision, and awarded Mr. Bailey an 
additional $1,081.91 for foreclosure attorney's fees bid at sale but 
not actually paid by the bank. (R. 125, paragraph 10) 
The case cited by the Bank, Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 
580 P.2d 243 (Utah, 1978) lists three criteria which must be met 
before a cause of action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata: 
Identity of parties, identity of claims and disposal of those claims 
on the merits. Let us examine these points separately. 
(1) The two cases must be between the same parties or 
their privies. 
Though one of the named plaintiffs and one of the named 
defendants in the bankruptcy suit are the plaintiff and defendant in 
this case, their porisions and capacities ·are different. 
Mr. Bailey sued in bankruptcy court as a third position 
mechanic's lien holder and as a sixth position purchaser of the 
bankrupts' equity in the property. (R. 003) In the state court 
action, Mr. Bailey was granted relief as the assignee of the position 
of Ivory and Co. (R. 122) In Conway v. Mosher 103 P.2d 456 
(Ariz., 1940) the Arizona Supreme Court held that where the Assignor 
(State of Arizona) had not been a party to a quiet title action its 
grantee or assignee was not bound by the quiet title action even 
though the grantee had been a party to the action in a different 
capacity. 
. [I]f the state was not foreclosed by the action 
to quiet title, neither was its assignee or grantee. (P. 467) 
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Likewise, if Ivory and Company's interest against the bank was 11111 
foreclosed by the bankruptcy dismissal, then neither was ils "''·': 
(Mr. Bailey) even though he was a party to the bankruptcy compldini 
The Bank was sued in the first action primarily as a first 
position lien holder and as a lender. Mr. Bailey challenged the 
bank's right to be in first position, claiming that as a lendor 
the bank had failed to properly distribute the construction loan fun: 
to Bailey who had provided materials to the property. In the state 
court action, Mr. Bailey was granted judgment against the Trustee 
who happened to be the bank but could just as well have been a title 
company or an attorney. The different capacities of the bank in 
the two actions should be considered by the court. 
Professor James Wm. Moore's Treatise on Federal Practice at 
Res Judicata Paragraph 0.411 [3.-2] Volume lB Page 427 states as 
follows: 
As we have seen, the practical view of parties for 
purposes of res judicata centers on the interest that is 
litigated rather than the names that appear in the 
pleadings . . . The capacities rule is but the other side 
of the coin; where the names are the same but the interests 
put into the litigationlJeIOng to others, res judicata 
follows the interest and not the name. 
Since Mr. Bailey asked the bankruptcy court to order the bank as 
trustee to stay the Trustee's Sale, Respondent unfortunately cannot 
claim complete lack of identity of the parties, but the different 
capacities in which the bank serves relative to the claims in the 
two actions is at least illustrative of the differences in the 
transactional facts of the two actions. 
(2) There must have been a final judgment on the 
merits of the prior case. 
- 9-
Rule 4l(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
1 an involuntary dismissal is a dismissal on the merits. The 
1ecord indicates that the dismissal was in fact voluntary and 
therefore not with prejudice. Counsel for Mr. Bailey submitted 
his Affidavit to the court which provides in part as follows: 
8. Judge Ralph R. Mabey granted a temporary restraining 
order on November 9, 1979, at 10:00 a.m. However, the 
order was not timelv served on the defendant's trustee until 
after the trustee's. sale had been accomplished. In con-
nection with the issuance of the temporary order, the Court 
set a hearing date in this matter for November 13, 1979. 
Both the undersigned affiant and counsel for the defendant 
were present at the hearing. 
9. At the haring referred to above, the issues raised 
by the plaintiff in its complaint in the Bankruptcy Court 
were not tried, and the matter was not dismissed with 
prejudice. The matter was dismissecr-after discussion 
between counsel and the Court because the issue of whether 
the sale should be delayed and whether the plaintiff 
should be allowed to cure the loan with the defendant 
were moot. It was understood by the Judge and counsel, 
that the funds received at the trustee's sale did not 
exceed, by far, the amount of the secured claims on the 
property. The Judge stated that because of the secured 
claims on the subject property, and the amount of the 
proceeds at the Trust Deed Trustee's Sale, the bankruptcy 
trustee, John Green, would have no claim on those proceeds, 
and the Bankruptcy Court would not be interested in 
adjudicating the claims to those funds. Therefore, the 
bankruptcy Judge suggested that the Bankruptcy Court should 
not be involved in this aspect of this matter, i.e. the 
adjudication of priority in the funds received by the 
trustee, Edward M. Garrett, acting on behalf of the defendant. 
This court should find that the plaintiff's undisputed agreement to 
the dismissal limited the res judicata effect of the dismissal to 
only those items specifically raised in the bankruptcy complaint. 
(3) The prior adjudication must have involved the 
same issue or an issue that could or should have been 
raised therein. 
The court below gave judginent to Mr. Bailey ordering the bank 
to distribute the excess proceeds of sale to plaintiff pursuant to 
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Utah Code Annotated§57-l-29. No claim for distribution of excess 
proceeds of sale was raised in the bankruptcy court complaint. 
fact, no claim _could have been made in the complaint since the 
had not yet taken place. On the contrary, the fervent intent ol 
Bailey's complaint in bankruptcy court was to prevent the sale fruc 
taking place. It was only after the essence of his complaint had 
been mooted by sale of the property and after the bankruptcy court 
had indicated that it did not care to be involved in the dispute 
over the proceeds of the Trustee's Sale (R. 63, 64) that the state 
court action was brought. 
It is clear that the state court cause was not actually brought 
in the earlier case. "Could or Should" the claim have been raised 
in the bankruptcy court? The could or should language of Utah and 
many other state cases is not very helpful. No court, including 
Utah's, has interpreted "should or could" to mean "was it possible 
to". Any permissable counterclaim, for instance, could be brought 
in an action by defendant, but only compulsory counterclaims are 
barred by res judicata if the defendant fails to raise them. 
Arizona interprets "could or should" to mean "could have been 
brought based upon the points in the record." Vance v. Vance 
601 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1979). Kansas used a different test. 
the claim have been litigated under the facts which gave rise to 
the cause of action?" Jay Hawk Equipment Company vs. Mentzer 
379 P. 2d 342 (Kan., 1973). Any specific Utah test has escaped 
Respondent's research. If this court has not adopted a specific 
test, Respondent respectfully ,submits that the Rule proposed in 
the restatement (second) and argued for by Professor Moore is the 
preferable rule. 
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The Restatement of the Law Second Judgments 2d 
Vol. 1 §24 provides as follows: 
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an 
acLion extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the 
rules.of merger or bar, the claim extinguished includes 
all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the 
defendant with respect to all or any part of the trans-
action, or series of transactions, out of which the action 
arose. 
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" 
and "series", are to be determined 
The transactional facts of the two cases are disperate. The first 
cause dealt with allegations of a defective Trust Deed and wrongful 
pay out of construction loan funds to the damage of a materialman 
who supplied materials to the construction site. The complaint 
asked for damages as a result, for voiding of the first position 
Trust Deed and for injunction of Trustee's· Sale or for reinstatement 
of the loan. The state court cause resulted in an order causing the 
Trustee on the Trust Deed to disperse excess proceeds of sale. No 
damages were awarded nor was the bank's first position Trust Deed 
invalidated. The transactions are separated in time, space and 
origin and could reasonably be expected from a business standpoint 
to be considered separate transactions. Defendant must argue that 
if a junior lien claimant unsuccessfully attacks a first position 
lender, that lien claimant automatically loses all position in the 
property andmay not pursue excess proceeds at Trustee's Sale. The 
facts of this case require defendant to take this argument even 
further. Since Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy court complaint was based 
on a third and sixth position in the property where his state court 
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complaint was based on a second position in the property which was 
assigned to him, the bank would have the court rule that should;, 
third position lien holder unsuccessfully challenge the rights ul 
a first position lender that all junior lien holders lose all 1 lici, 
rights to the property whether they are parties or not. 
The bankruptcy court's order did not bar plaintiff's complaint 
in the state court. 
POINT II: THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER ON ITS FACE CLEARLY 
DOES NOT EXTEND THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURT THROUGH TO THE PROCEEDS OF SALE 
While it is true that 28 U.S.C. §1471 grants exclusive 
jurisdiction over the property of the bankrupt to the bankruptcy 
court. It is just as clear that the bankruptcy trustee may on his 
own motion or upon petition by other claimants, abandon jurisdiction 
of the property. 11 U.S.C. §554 provides in pertinent part as folio 
(a) After notice and a hearing, the Trustee may abandon 
any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate 
or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. 
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice 
and a hearing, the court may order the Trustee to abandon 
any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate 
and that is of inconsequential value to the estate. 
* * * 
Though the banks complaint in reclaimation to obtain abandonment 
of real property was an unorthodox if not incorrect procedure for 
a secured creditor, it nevertheless was effective and the bankruptcy 
court abandoned its jurisdiction as follows: 
That the relief sought in the complaint by Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan Association is granted and said 
Association may proceed to Trustee's Sale on the real 
property descirbed in the complaint herein pursuant to 
the laws of the state of Uta:h. (R. 40-41) 
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Once the bankruptcy court has abandoned property, it is irrevocable. 
111 Polumbo 271 F. Supp 640 (DC Va., 1967). Though the court 
I o·:n ly abandoned the property, the bank to obtain such a ruling, 
;t ipulated and agreed that should it obtain the property at the 
Trustee's Sale, it would then offer this property for sale in a 
commercially reasonable manner and pay the excess to the court. The 
second part of the Order of the Court provided as follows: 
In the event that Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
Association should be the successful bidder at the Trustee's 
Sale and shall acquire title to part or all of the real 
property herein, free of other liens, then the property 
so acquired shall be offered for sale by the Association 
in a commercially reasonable manner and in the event that 
the sum in excess of that necessary to fully satisfy the 
note, Trust Deed, interest, costs and attorney's fees is 
realized upon the sale, such excess shall be paid over to 
the cout for further disposition. (R. 40-41) (Emphasis added) 
Though Deseret Federal acquired the property, the results of a 
commercially reasonable sale are not in evidence or issue in this 
action. It is clear that any amounts to be paid into bankruptcy 
court are amounts realized from a second sale, a commercially 
reasonable sale, not the Trustee's Sale. 
The Third Judicial District Court was put into a position 
of having to interpret the meaining and import of a bankruptcy order. 
On its face and with the further clarification given by the affidavit 
of James R. Ivins, the court reasonably construed the order of the 
bankruptcy court to mean that the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned 
any claim to the proceeds of the Trustee's Sale and that the priority 
and distribution of the proceeds of the Trustee's Sale could be 
distributed as the state court directed pursuant U.C.A. 57-1-29. 
The lower court did not err in•. its interpretation that the 
bankruptcy court had abandoned its interest in the proceeds. 
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POINT III: DEFENDANT FAILED TO FOLLOW APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE 
FOR HAULTING THE ACTION IN STATE COURT 
It was defendant's responsibility to get an Order from 
bankruptcy court staying the proceeding and superceding the 
jurisdiction of the state court. The bank argues that the purpose 
and effect of the bankruptcy court orders have been thwarted by 
action in the state court. Substantially prior to trial, the 
bank brought a Motion for Stnnmary Judgment. In its memorandum, 
the bank argued as follows: 
It must be conceded that the bankruptcy court had 
full and complete jurisdiction of all matters relating to 
the said Lot 46 and acted thereon. That being the case, 
this court has no jurisdiction over the matters sought 
to be litigated by plaintiff. This jurisdiction continues 
over the property of the bankrupt until the bankruptcy 
court formally divests itself of jurisdiction by 
abandonment or in some other manner. (R. 19,20) 
When the state court clearly rejected the bank's interpretation 
of the bankruptcy court rulings, the bank.should have gone back to 
bankruptcy court to obtain an order clearly asserting the bank-
ruptcy court's desire to maintain jurisdiction over the property. 
This would have been a relatively simple procedure and had that been 
the true intent of the bankruptcy court the trial and this appeal 
would have been avoided. Respondent submits that the bank should 
be estopped from asserting a contrary interpretation of the 
bankruptcy court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment by the court below was based upon the plaintiff', 
suit for an order directing the disposition of proceeds of the 
Trustee's Sale pursuant to U.C.A. This issue was neithei 
raised nor litigated in the bankruptcy court. The directed 
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distribution to Mr. Bailey was based on the rights of the Ivory 
second trust deed. The state action below arose only after the 
!lank as trustee conducted the sale while the bankruptcy court action 
was connnenced prior to the trustee's sale and sought to prevent 
the trustee's sale and to adjudicate the validity of the first lien 
of the bank. Mr. Bailey's action in this matter was not, therefore, 
barred by res judicata. The lower court did not err in so holding 
nor did the court err in its findings that the bankruptcy court 
had abandoned the proceeds of the trustee's sale by its specific 
order. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of August, 1983. 
NEWTON & IVINS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two correct copies of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed to Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E. 
Hatch, GARRETT & STURDY, 311 South State Street, Suite 320, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111 this /(:z..--- day of August, 1983. 
APPENDIX 1 
li7-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's 1al-Di.sposition.-The trustee shall 
apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, firat, to the costs and expenses of 
exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of 
the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount 
which may he pr.ovided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of the 
obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the peraon 
or persona legally entiUed thereto, or the trustee, in his discretion, may 
deposit the balance of such proceeds with the county clerk of the county 
in which the sale took place. Upon depositing such balance, the trustee 
shall be discharged from all further responsibility therefor and the 
county clerk shall deposit the same with the county treasurer subject to 
the order of the district court of said county. 
Jlhtol')': L. 1961, ch. 181, § lL 
